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Abstract
Background: Decision analysis and game theory [1,2] have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning
and modeling contexts [3–5]. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity
conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria. These are
cases in which each agent pursuing individual self–interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible
outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate
how game–theoretical representation can inform group decision-making.
Methodology and Principal Findings: The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation
scenarios with Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria: (i) a two–agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii) a three–agent
raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii) an n–agent fish and coral conservation scenario
from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism–design solutions that appeal to
material incentives may be inadequate, and the game–theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further
deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust—and confidence—building measures.
Conclusions and Significance: Game theory can and should be used as a normative tool in biodiversity conservation
contexts: identifying scenarios with Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria enables constructive action in order to achieve (closer
to) optimal conservation outcomes, whether by policy solutions based on mechanism design or otherwise. However, there
is mounting evidence [6] that formal mechanism–design solutions may backfire in certain cases. Such scenarios demand a
return to group deliberation and the creation of reciprocal relationships of trust.
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Introduction
Efforts to conserve and promote biodiversity require at least two
normative commitments [7]. First, operationalizing the concept of
‘‘biodiversity’’ involves deciding which taxa or other biodiversity
surrogates are worth the allocation of finite conservation resources
[7–9]. Second, the goal of biodiversity conservation must be
negotiated with other normatively salient social goals such as
economic well–being, public health, etc., especially when land use
policies are being formulated [7,10,11]. In both cases, there is
ample potential for conflict. When these conflicts occur for a single
agent (individual or organized group), decision support tools based
on multi–criteria analysis (MCA) typically provide useful insight
[3,12,13]. In this paper we show that when these conflicts involve
differences between more than one agent, game theory may play a
similar role. The mathematical theory of games has traditionally
been used by social scientists to model strategic interaction, and is
thus easily adapted to modeling conflicts between multiple
stakeholders in conservation contexts. The main result in this
paper is to use game theory to show that there exist conservation
conflicts with Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria. The games we
analyze share this property with the well-known ‘‘Prisoner’s
Dilemma’’ (PD) and many other games [14].
In biodiversity conservation contexts, two potential roles for
game theory can be distinguished. The first role, well–understood
in evolutionary theory and economics, is descriptive. Evolutionary
games can be used to model frequency–dependent selection
[15,16]. In economics, traditional (‘‘rational choice’’) game theory
can be used to explain macro–behavioral outcomes by appealing
to the equilibrium of some underlying game [1,2]. Game theory
can be used in the same way to describe biodiversity conservation
conflicts [5]. However, our focus will be on the second normative (or
prescriptive) role of game theory. We show that identifying
conflicts with Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria enables construc-
tive action in order to achieve (closer to) optimal conservation
outcomes, whether by familiar policy solutions based on
mechanism design or otherwise [6]. (A mechanism–design solution
is one which is based on the design of optimal individual incentive
structures.) Attaining Pareto–efficient cooperative outcomes need
not proceed via formal institutional arrangements at all, but may
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relationships of trust and other confidence–building measures.
Moreover, there is reason to suggest that, in certain cases,
mechanism–design solutions may backfire. Game theory thus
serves as a normative tool, and provides a precise analytical
framework which can be used to recognize the sub–optimality of
certain conservation situations relative to a well–defined set of
assumptions, while pointing towards possible solutions.
The Methods section introduces decision analysis, game theory,
and describes one well–studied game with a Pareto–inefficient
Nash equilibrium (the Prisoner’s Dilemma). In the Results and
Discussion section we report two–agent, three–agent, and n–agent
conservation conflicts from case studies. Throughout this paper,
we will use the following standard definitions of Nash equilibrium
and Pareto–efficiency. An outcome is a Nash equilibrium if no agent
can do better by unilaterally deviating from the current course of
action (strategy): each agent’s action is a ‘‘best response’’ to the
actions of the other agents. An outcome is Pareto–efficient if, relative
to the other possible outcomes, no agent can be made better off
without making at least one agent worse off. An outcome is Pareto–
inefficient if there exists some other outcome such that at least one
agent is made better off while no agent is made worse off.
Results
Two–agent conservation conflict: Wild dogs in South
Africa
In South Africa, endangered carnivorous wild dogs (Lycaon pictus)
were re-introduced into conservation areas in 1980–1981, and
again in 1997 and in the early 2000s [17,18]. The conservation
plan analyzed here involved re-introduction of the species to the
900 km2 Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park in eastern South Africa [19],
notable for attracting many South African and international
visitors, primarily ecotourists. The park contained numerous large
carnivores, including spotted hyaena (Crocuta crocuta), black-backed
jackal (Canis mesomelas), cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus), lion (Panthera leo),
and leopard (Panthera pardus). Conservation proponents intended to
create meta–populations of Lycaon pictus that would be managed
with occasional translocation between sub–populations to facilitate
gene flow [20]. By 2004, after more than 20 years of sporadic
conservation measures, it was reported that the park itself
supported nearly 50 dogs living in six packs, with an unknown
number living in the surrounding unprotected areas.
Both biodiversity conservation proponents, concerned that only
about 6 000 individuals of this species remained in the wild, and
the ecotourism industry, which found that tourists rated seeing the
wild dogs quite highly, had an interest in promoting the re-
introduction and translocation policies [21]. However, rural
herders and game farmers had an interest in the safety of their
livestock or game populations, and many of them adopted a policy
of killing wild dogs and other carnivores that escaped from
conservation areas.
Although the local farmers, herders, and gamekeepers on
private land, as well as Zulu villagers on communal land, were
partly protected by the Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park’s electric perim-
eter fence, many of the large carnivores, especially the wild dogs,
were known to escape from the park. Local community members
held wild dogs responsible for roughly 15% of the annual livestock
loss [18]. In response, conservation proponents accompanied the
re-introduction and translocation policies with a public–relations
campaign and a conservation education program for surrounding
communities from 1999 to 2000. Results were assessed for progam
effectiveness in 2003. While ecotourists consistently reported
positive attitudes toward seeing the wild dogs, and were willing
to pay up to $ 150 for a chance to see them, villagers’ attitudes
toward the conservation program became more negative between
1999 and 2003. Furthermore, among those with limited
educational background, misconceptions about the wild dogs
and the goals of biodiversity conservation were found to be
widespread, and escaped dogs continued to be occasionally killed
despite legal protection.
Game-theoretic Analysis. The game represented in Table 1,
which has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), can be used
to represent the conflict between the conservation proponents
(row) and local herders (column). We treat bodiversity
conservation proponents and the ecotourism industry as one
agent, A, because of their common shared interest; in the analysis
below they will be referred to as conservation proponents. Each
action available to A corresponds to a row of Table 1: these are to
continue the re-location and translocation policy (T) or not do so
(:T). Similarly, we treat the herders and game farmers, B, as one
agent and simply refer to them jointly as local herders. The actions
available to B correspond to the columns: these are to have a
policy of killing escaped dogs (K) or not do so (:K). The numbers
represent ordinal rankings of the outcomes, where 1 is the best
outcome, 2 is the next best outcome, and so on, and are given
vRow,Columnw with the first entry indicating the rank for A
and the second the rank for B. The standard assumptions of one–
stage games are applicable: each agent has full knowledge of its
preference structure and is a competent maximizer over its own
preference ordering.
Obviously, the best outcome for B is v:T,Kw, while the best
outcome for A is vT,:Kw. The worst outcome for B is clearly
vT,:Kw, assuming the wild dogs are responsible for significant
livestock loss. The worst outcome for A is v:T,Kw, since no
conservation translocation is pursued while B’s policy threatens
the feasibility of future conservation programs. The second– and
third–best outcomes for A are v:T,:Kw and vT,Kw,
respectively, on the assumption that the translocation policy
comes at significant cost, and if killing takes place the cost of the
translocation program would not be worth the little conservation
value it would generate. The second– and third–best outcomes for
B are v:T,:Kw and vT,Kw, respectively, on the assumption
that without a translocation policy fewer wild carnivores threaten
their livestock, while killing the escaped wild dogs is itself costly.
For A, T is preferred to :T, since whatever B’s policy, the
outcomes in which translocation policies are pursued are ranked
higher: 3 as opposed to 4 and 1 as opposed to 2. The same
reasoning on preferences shows, for B, K is preferred to :K. The
unique pure–strategy Nash equilibrium is thus vT,Kw, since
neither agent can do better by unilaterally deviating from the
strategy already being followed. (In pure strategies each of the
Table 1. Two–Agent Game with Pareto–inefficient Nash
Equilibrium.
K : : : : : : : :K
T 3,3 1,4
:T 4,1 2,2
Agents: Column: local herders; Row: conservationists and eco-tourism industry.
Strategies for local herders: K: Kill escaped wild dogs (or not, :K). Strategies for
conservationists and eco-tourism industry: T: Continue re-location and
translocation policy (or not, :T). Numbers represent purely ordinal preferences
over outcomes (where 1 is most preferred, 2 the next most preferred, and so
on), and are given vRow,Columnw.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010688.t001
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them in some proportion. For simplicity we do not analyze such
mixed strategies—they are unlikely to be followed on the ground
and, in this case, would not make any difference in the formal
analysis.) This equilibrium outcome, however, is Pareto–ineffi-
cient, since v:T,:Kw is ranked 2 for both agents as opposed to
3. While v:T,:Kw is not the unique Pareto–efficient solution,
since v:T,Kw and vT,:Kw are most preferred by B and A,
respectively, and ipso facto Pareto–efficient, these latter two
outcomes are unattractive solutions as they are the least preferred
by some agent.
Discussion: Wild dogs in South Africa. Gusset et. al. [18]
have analyzed this conflict in some detail but did not note its
relation to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Besides documenting the
existence of the conflict between conservation proponents and
local herders, they providede insight into possible solutions that
prioritize conservation (and thus assume that T is necessarily
preferred to :T). These solutions include continuing programs of
conservation education, compensation measures for livestock loss,
and participatory management policies [22]. Modeling the
situation as a game provides additional insight. Any
conservation–prioritizing solution to the conflict must either alter
the payoffs for the local stakeholders (the herders), by de–
incentivizing K or incentivizing :K, via conventional mechanism–
design solutions involving (effective) law enforcement and/or
financial incentives, or else directly alter the preferences of the
locals, which was presumably the goal of conservation education.
Gusset et. al. [18] noted that most of the locals had generally
negative views of wild dogs. This suggests that improved
husbandry practices combined with conservation education may
be the most cost–effective solution.
However, Gibson and Marks [5] used a two–agent game to
analyze the interactions between law enforcement personnel and
wildlife hunters in Zambia. Though they did not explicitly analyze
Nash equilibria or Pareto efficiency, their models revealed ample
potential for conflict which was already clear on the ground.
Zambia’s Administrative Management Design for Game Man-
agement Areas (ADMADE) program attempted a reconciliation
through the conventional mechanism–design solutions mentioned
in the last paragraph except for the emphasis on conservation
education in South Africa. ADMADE’s attempt met with little
success [5] indicating that, even in straightforward two–agent
situations, mechanism–design solutions may not be effective.
Prospects for such solutions are even more dim in more complex
situations, to which we now turn.
Three–agent conservation conflict: Raptors and red
grouse
In Britain, in the 1990s, the relationship between raptors and
their avian prey emerged as one of the more contentious issues in
discussions of natural habitat conservation and management [23–
25]. Whereas many raptor species’ populations had begun to
recover from their earlier pesticide–induced low levels of the
1970s, their prey species’ populations were often in decline.
Thirgood et al. [25] reviewed how this conflict was being played
out in the case of the Hen Harrier (Circus cyaneus) and Red Grouse
(Lagopus lagopus scotius) on heather moorlands dominated by Ling
Heather (Calluna vulgaris). The distribution of these heather
moorlands was largely limited to Britain and Ireland with smaller
areas elsewhere in Europe. Consequently, in Britain, retention of
these moorlands was considered to have a high conservation
priority.
Heather moorlands supported unusually high populations of
Red Grouse. Though many other bird species also utilized this
habitat, Red Grouse was the only species entirely restricted to it
[26]. However, for most of those who wanted to preserve the
moorlands, their retention was motivated not by concern for the
ultimate survival of this species but, rather, because Red Grouse
shooting was central to local economies. The primary aim of Red
Grouse management had always been to maximize the number of
individuals available for shooting every Fall. Gamekeepers
attempted to achieve this aim through the control of parasites
and predators of Red Grouse populations. Among birds, three
raptor species were among the implicate predators: the Hen
Harrier, the Golden Eagle (Aquila chrysaetos), and the Peregrine
Falcon (Falco peregrinus) [27,28]. The most important of these (by
far) was the Hen Harrier. Hen Harriers, in turn, were prey for
Golden Eagles. Though Golden Eagles presumably also preyed on
Red Grouse, their role in controlling grouse populations was
presumed to be minor compared to that of Hen Harriers [29,30].
Thirgood et al.’s [25] review of the raptor–grouse conflict
identified three potential and actual actions that would affect
conservation prospects of the three species:
K Hen Harriers could be culled to control their popula-
tions. The expected result would be increases in Red
Grouse populations and the economic benefits associat-
ed with it. Culling was already taking place through
hunting which, though technically illegal, was neverthe-
less apparently widely practiced.
D Diversionary feeding (e.g., carrion) could be introduced
for Hen Harriers. This was believed to be able to
decrease the predation pressure on Red Grouse though
not to the same extent as K. It is assumed in this analysis
that this action would benefit Hen Harrier populations
to some extent at least so long as culling (K) was not
undertaken. If culling were introduced, it is likely that D
would have very little—if any—effect [31].
I Golden Eagles could be introduced into Hen Harrier
habitat. It is assumed (as was very likely) that the benefit
to Red Grouse due to Golden Eagle predation of Hen
Harriers outweighed the loss due to predation of the Red
Grouse. (The analysis below will make the same
assumption.)
We next show that each of these potential actions falls under the
jurisdiction of a unique agent (an interest group consisting of an
easily distinguished set of stakeholders).
Agents and Goals. From Thirgood et al.’s [25] description,
there were many stakeholders involved in the dispute, from
gamekeepers whose job was to maintain high Red Grouse
populations for hunting, to ardent raptor conservationists
interested in either one or both of the raptor species. However,
it turns out that these varied stakeholders can be naturally
organized into interest groups, each coupled to one of the actions
identified above. The principle used for this grouping is that
members of each group strongly share interest in some action that
the group would encourage and different groups disagree on what
that action is. It turns out that, by examining who is likely to be
interested in each of the actions discussed above, a natural
stratification into three groups becomes possible, simplifying the
rest of this analysis.
Thus, each of the following three interest groups will be treated
as a single agent in the game-theoretic analysis below:
A1 Gamekeepers and others who were economically
dependent on Red Grouse hunting and wanted their
populations to be as large as possible so as to maximize
Game Theory in Biodiv Cons
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A1 would have control over K since it is in its interest to
cull Hen Harriers. While the other agents may
disapprove of culling, it is unlikely that they would have
much influence since hunting of Hen Harriers was
apparently already being practiced even though it was
illegal.
A2 Hen Harrier conservationists who were concerned
primarily with the welfare of that species, in part
because they had once disappeared from all of Britain
except the Scottish islands of Orkney and Hebrides: A2
would presumably have almost complete control over D,
since that action has some potential to help the Hen
Harrier population at least when culling does not occur.
Moreover, A2 is likely to be the only group willing to
expend effort directed towards D for Hen Harriers.
A3 Golden Eagle conservationists who were similarly
primarily concerned with the welfare of that species.
Presumably A3 would have sole control over I because
of its expense, and in spite of probable reservations of
A2, because in carrying out I, A3 would have at least
some support from A1.
In one respect this characterization of the interest groups may
be slightly artificial since Thirgood et al. [25] do not distinguish
Hen Harrier and Golden Eagle conservationists quite as sharply.
However, it is useful to distinguish them because of the potential
for conflict between Hen Harrier and Golden Eagle conservation
due to the former being a potential prey of the latter, a problem
which Thirgood et al. [25] do note.
Preference Analysis. Table 2 shows the rank order of the
preferences of the agents for each of the eight possible set of three
actions that can be taken by the agents. These form the set of
alternatives (called ‘‘outcomes’’ in the rest of this paper) in this
decision analysis with each action, K, D, and I (doing it or not)
being an available option for the agent associated with that action.
This means that A1 can only choose between K and :K, A2
between D and :D, and A3 between I and :I. An outcome
consists of one action each from each of the three agents (as shown
in Table 2), and the complete preference structure consists of a
ranking of the entire outcome set by each of the agents.
For A1, clearly (K,D,I) is the best outcome (that is, it has rank
1), because each of these actions benefit Red Grouse. Assuming
that Red Grouse predation by Golden Eagles does happen to some
extent (though it is not as serious as culling), the next best outcome
is (K,D,:I). Both (K,:D,I) and (:K,D,I) are ranked 3, assuming
that the combined effect of diversionary feeding and predation and
the crucial fact that no effort is expended by A1 in the latter case
cancels out the effect of culling in the former case. Since culling
Hen Harriers is potentially a very effective way to reduce Red
Grouse mortality (K,:D,:I) is ranked as 4. There is probably not
much to distinguish (:K,D,:I) and (:K,:D,I)—these are both
ranked as 5. Clearly, (:K,:D,:I) is the worst because no action at
all is taken to augment Red Grouse populations.
Agent A2’s concerns are limited to Hen Harriers (in this model).
Diversionary feeding, along with no culling and no predation, that
is, (:K,D,:I), is the best option. Keeping the other two acts as
they are, while not introducing diversionary feeding, that is,
(:K,:D,:I) comes in at 2 as, from the same type of reasoning,
does (:K,D,I). By losing diversionary feeding, (:K,:D,I) gets
rank 3. It is assumed that when culling (K) occurs, diversionary
feeding (D) does little to augment Hen Harrier populations, but
predation (I) still has a small negative effect on them. Moreover,
A2 presumably does not want to waste effort in performing D if it
does not help Hen Harriers. Thus, taking wasted effort into
account, (K,:D,:I) is given rank 4,( K,D,:I) rank 5, and
(K,:D,I) rank 6. The situation is worst when both culling and
predation occur, and A2 also wastes effort, that is, (K,D,I).
Turning to A3, the best outcome for Golden Eagles is clearly
(:K,D,I), when the species is being introduced in Hen Harrier
habitat and the main prey species is being encouraged to grow by
no culling and diversionary feeding. For Golden Eagles, the
outcome is only slightly worse if Hen Harriers lose diversionary
feeding: (:K,:D,I) has rank 2. Beyond these two cases, assuming
that diversionary feeding is not very important for Hen Harrier
populations, the ranks A3 gives will be neutral with respect to D
and :D. Both (K,D,I) and (K,:D,I) will be ranked 3. Next come
(:K,D,:I) and (:K,:D,:I). The worst scenarios are (K,D,:I)
and (K,:D,:I).
Game–theoretic Analysis. The decision scenario discussed
above can be modeled as a three–agent game with each agent, A1,
A2, and A3 having control over one action: K, D, and I,
respectively. As noted earlier, this is a simplifying but plausible
assumption in this context. Agents’ preferences over the eight
possible outcomes were enumerated in Table 2. The standard
assumptions of one–stage game theory are applicable: each agent
has full knowledge of the preference structure and is a competent
maximizer over that agent’s own preference ordering.
This game will be analyzed to determine which outcomes, if
any, are Nash equilibria and which are Pareto–efficient. For
simplicity, attention will be restricted to pure strategies. In
Appendix S1, it is shown that there is a unique Nash equilibrium,
which is the outcome, (K,:D,I). In Appendix S2 it is then shown
that there are four Pareto–efficient outcomes, (K,D,I), (K,D,:I),
(:K,D,I), and (:K,D,:I). In other words, the Nash equilibrium,
(K,:D,I), is a Pareto–inefficient outcome. In fact, it is Pareto–
inferior to (:K,D,I), which would leave no agent worse off and A2
and A3 better off.
Discussion: Raptors and red grouse. It is worth emphasis
that the assumptions about group decisions that are made in
computing the set of Pareto–efficient outcomes were minimal. It is
only assumed that the outcomes have a complete ranking with ties
allowed (that is, a complete weak ordering) on the basis of each
Table 2. Agents’ Preference Structure.
Agent
Outcome A1 A2 A3








Agents: A1: Gamekeepers and Red Grouse hunters; A2: Hen Harrier
conservationists; A3: Golden eagle conservationists. Strategies: K: Cull Hen
Harriers (or not, :K); D: Introduce diversionary feeding for Hen Harriers (or not,
:D); I: Introduce Golden Eagles into Hen Harrier habitat (or not, :I). Numbers
represent purely ordinal preferences over outcomes (where 1 is most preferred,
2 the next most preferred, and so on). See Appendix S1 for Nash equilibrium
analysis and Appendix S2 for Pareto–efficiency analysis. For a justification of the
ranking for each stakeholder, see the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010688.t002
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whether the outcomes can be given quantitative (cardinal)
values. If there is more information available on agents’
preferences, more structure can be given to the set of Pareto–
efficient outcomes (see below). However, that does not change the
existence of the fundamental conflict between Pareto–efficient and
Nash equilibrium outcomes because it was generated by the
minimal assumptions noted above about what was collectively
preferable.
An important limitation of this analysis is that, as in the two–
player game discussed earlier, it is restricted to pure strategies:
agents do not have the option of mixed strategies in which they
sometimes carry out one action and sometimes do not. Moreover,
in most practical contexts, a problem remains: there are four
Pareto–efficient outcomes: (K,D,I), (K,D,:I), (:K,D,I), and
(:K,D,:I) and only one of these can be implemented. The set
of Pareto–efficient outcomes may have to be analyzed further to
come up with a credible policy recommendation. In the context of
multi-criteria decisions in biodiversity conservation planning, this
is a well-studied problem [3,11,13]. Many of the insights obtained
in that context carry over to that of group decisions and the rest of
this section draws heavily on those discussions. There are at least
two options available at this stage:
1. Additional assumptions about agents’ preferences can be
introduced to compound them to produce unique results.
Methods range from simple voting to aggregating individual
utility functions into a group utility function. None of these
methods is devoid of conceptual problems which are well–
known but beyond the scope of this analysis: they do not
resolve the basic conflict between Nash equilibria and Pareto–
efficiency.
2. Sorting out the Pareto–efficient alternatives may be handed
over to a deliberative process in which the agents discuss these
outcomes. (If the number of Pareto–efficient outcomes is
small—say, less than five—this is a far more appropriate
response than if it is large. In general the number of these
outcomes will scale with the number of agents [32]. Some
criteria that may be used (but are not immune to the charge of
being ad hoc) have some reasonable intuitive support. For
instance, any extremal outcome (a unique outcome that is the
most preferred by any of the agents) will always be Pareto–
efficient no matter how poorly it is ranked by all other agents. It
may, therefore, be reasonable to drop most of such extremal
outcomes by deliberative choice: in the case study of this paper,
(K,D,I), (:K,D,I), and (:K,D,:I) would be dropped leaving
only (K,D,:I) as a policy recommendation. Another method
may be to deliberate on the values of all agents. In the case
study here, it is reasonable to suppose that A2 and A3 may have
moral scruples about killing animals. Thus, they may want to
drop (K,D,I) and (K,D,:I) and then agree to choose (:K,D,I)
over (:K,D,:I) because that is in accord with A1’s preferences.
The most important conclusion suggested by our discussion is
that the best way to resolve the conflict between the Nash
equilibrium and Pareto–efficiency is through a deliberative process
and not through mechanism–design, that is, the elaboration of
individual material incentives. While it is plausible to alter
incentives to change the preference structure of Table 2 to
remove this conflict, the fact that it occurred from a straightfor-
ward preference set attribution suggests that such conflicts will be
ubiquitous. This is why we emphasize deliberative collective
decisions rather than mechanism–design. Finally, it should also be
noted that, unlike the two–agent wild dogs case presented above,
this game is not straightforwardly interpretable as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma event though it shares with that game the property of
having a unique Nash equilibrium that is also Pareto–inefficient.
The n–agent dilemma: Fish and corals in the Philippines
Coral reefs, especially those in the southern Philippines and
central Indonesia, are widely regarded as biodiversity ‘‘hotspots’’
of high conservation priority [33]. These rich marine ecosystems
are home to hundreds of thousands of fish, bivalve, gastropod,
cephalopod, crustacean, echinoderm, algae, and other species,
many of which are typically micro–endemics. While human
activities on land contribute to reef degradation via the
‘‘downstream’’ effects of agricultural and logging activities,
industrial run-offs and other pollutants, in the marine arena,
overfishing and destructive fishing techniques (e.g., those using
improvised explosives or sodium cyanide) have also been centrally
implicated in reef destruction [33]. These reefs are often vital to
local economies. In the Philippines, for example, over–crowded
coral fisheries support an economic livelihood for over a million
fishers [34].
The destructive ecological effects of overfishing on coral reefs
are well documented. Two examples will help set the context [35]:
(i) in the Philippine coral reef system of Bolinao, overfishing led to
near extinction for the sea urchin (Tripneustis gratilla), which had
been formerly quite abundant in the reef’s seagrass beds; (ii) in
Kenya reefs were threatened by overfishing because the removal
of high–level predators led to a dramatic increase in populations of
drupellid snails which feed on coral.
According to McManus et al. [36], roughly 350 marine species
from the 40 km2 Bolinao reef area are sold in local markets. In
spite of the practice being banned in 1979, fishers continue to use
explosive fishing techniques and have a strong financial incentive
to do so: dangerous homemade bombs are cheap to produce at US
$1–2 and can generate a catch worth US $15–40 while the average
fisher, using non–destructive techniques, generates only about US
$1 a day. They report that informal surveys of the reef area in the
mid–1980s showed that 60% of scleractinian coral was dead, much
apparently due to fishing with explosives. Furthermore, their
simple models indicated that fishing with explosives may have
reduced the growth capacity of scleractinian coral by a third or
more, with predictably negative effects for biodiversity.
Game–theoretic analyses have been used in many analyses of
fishing policies (and these models have been reviewed by Sumaila
[4]). The open–access version of the n–agent game described
below corrsponds to the classic ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’ While
the analysis is simple, we provide it because it captures the
dynamics of overfishing in coral reefs in Bolinao where the
resource is over–exploited because of no clear established rights of
use. The Nash equilibrium outcome of collective over–exploitation
of fish and the use of destructive fishing techniques is both
economically undesirable (because of Pareto–inefficiency), as well
as a major threat to healthy reefs and, thus, to sustainability and
the conservation of biodiversity. However, we then go on to show
that, even in a closed–access n–agent gave, there can be a conflict
between resource management policies based on ‘‘maximum
sustainable yield’’ (MSY) and biodiversity conservation. In this
case, due to the ecological interactions between the exploited fish
and other reef species of high conservation priority, MSY harvest
levels for the exploited species may lead to a decline of other
species targeted for conservation as important components of
biodiversity. The analysis assumes that, in the long run, this trend
leads to a decline in the exploited species because of mutualistic
interactions–however, this part of the analysis should be regarded
as a conceptual exercise rather than an exploration of the data.
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open–access fisheries [37,38], as well as Hardin’s [39] less formal
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ model of common pool resources,
predict overfishing when individual or collective access/property
rights to fisheries are ill–defined. The ‘‘bionomic equilibrium’’ is
the point at which the population is so depleted that even minimal
harvesting effort is not worth the expected return [40].
This situation can also be represented as an n–agent PD, with
the payoffs for agents along the rows as given in Table 3. The
payoffs are symmetric for all agents, in the sense that all agents find
themselves in the situation described by the payoff matrix. The
non–cooperative action, D, is to harvest as much as possible now
(or, in the case of overfishing in Philippine reefs, use destructive
fishing methods like dynamite or cyanide). ND denotes the number
of agents who play D, the non-cooperative harvesting effort, and
tƒn is some threshold value (‘‘tipping point’’) such that, where t or
more agents defect, the outcome shifts from the left to the right
column: the common–pool resource is overexploited and fishing is
not worth the effort. We assume the cooperative action C is to
restrain harvesting effort to a level such that, if NDvt, the
population is sustainable over time.
For the preference structure, we assume TwRwPwS. This
means that the the worst case for each agents is to restrain
harvesting effort while others overexploit the fish. The best case is
for an insignificant number of others (vt) to defect while agents
harvests as much as possible. The second–best case for agents is to
cooperate while all (or a significant number) of others cooperate by
restraining harvesting effort. The third–best case for an agent is to
defect, achieving a short–term gain while the fish population
reaches bionomic equilibrium: enough agents defect such that the
population is over–exploited in a short time. An agent does better
by defecting no matter what the others do, since TwR and PwS.
The Nash equilibrium solution of this game is the situation in
which all defect, and the fish are overexploited. This is each
agent’s third–best outcome, whereas if everyone cooperated they
would have achieved their second–best outcomes, and the
exploited population of fish would persist at a sustainable level.
In this case, biodiversity values and economic values both
prescribe conservation action. Economically, the open–access
Nash equilibrium is inferior to the cooperative outcome for every
agent: the latter is strictly preferred to the former by every agent.
Furthermore, the destructive fishing techniques and overfishing
that characterize the open–access equilibrium clearly threaten reef
integrity and biodiversity.
However, a second n–agent PD may arise that pits economic
and conservation values against one another in the short term.
Consider the situation in which the open–access problem (the
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’) for some reef fishery has been solved
by privatization, government control, or community management,
such that a resource management plan for ‘‘maximum sustainable
yield’’ (MSY) of the fish has been instituted. We still assume there
are a number of agents extracting fish, but in this game the Nash
equilibrium is for the agents to ‘‘restrain’’ their harvesting effort to
the MSY level. Crucially, we make an assumption about the
ecological interactions between the exploited fish and the
surrounding reef ecosystem: the MSY harvesting effort will, over
time, lead to a slow decline in some endemic species of high
conservation priority. As the population of this second species
declines, the population of the exploited species will as well, such
that the ‘‘MSY’’ harvesting effort is actually unsustainable. (For a
partial justification of this assumption, see the cases described by
Redford and Feinsinger [41].)
This second, parallel n–agent PD is represented in Table 4. In
the open–access n–agent game, we assumed that some policy
similar to MSY harvesting was the ‘‘cooperative’’ option. In the
closed–access case, the cooperative action will be denoted by
BCE, for biodiversity conservation effort, and the non–coopera-
tive option is the more intensive MSY harvesting, denoted by
MSY. Otherwise, the preference structure is exactly parallel. The
Nash equilibrium solution sustains the fish species in the short
term, but as the second species slowly declines, in the long run,
catches of the economically valuable fish decline in turn. Thus the
Pareto–efficient solution involves each agent restraining harvesting
effort beyond the short–term MSY point.
Discussion: Fish and corals in Southeast Asia.
Overfishing in coral reefs is both an economic and biodiversity
conservation issue, especially in cases like that described by White
et al. [34], in which fish levels in some areas of the Philippines have
dropped below those necessary to sustain healthy coral reefs. They
report that while healthy reefs can sustainably produce 20 t=km2=yr
of edible products, reefs degraded due to overfishing or cyanide use
produce less than 4 t=km2=yr. (Other economic benefits attaching
to the preservation of biodiversity in reefs include revenue from
tourism: reef diving, tour fees, etc.)
Admittedly, our closed–access n–agent PD is only a speculative
ecological model, but it brings into focus the need for conservation
and resource management planners to take long–term ecological
interactions into account in assessing solutions to conservation–
relevant economic conflicts. In particuar, it shows that appeal to
theories of sustainable exploitation may at best produce short–
term Pareto optimal outcomes.
The formal mechanism–design solution to the n–agent PD
alters the preference structure for each agent via material
incentives or the threat of punishment by defining clear use rights.
It is well–known that enforceable government ownership, group
ownership, or individual ownership can go a long way towards
preventing over–exploitation of resources [42]. Even in closed–
access fisheries, however, further regulations and incentives may
be necessary to ensure sustainability when multiple users compete
Table 3. Open-access n–agent game.
NDv v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v vtN D§ § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §t
CR S
DT P
Agents: n fishers in an open–access fishery. Strategies: D: harvest as much as
possible now; C: restrain harvesting effort to maximum sustainable yield levels.
ND: number of agents who play D, t is tipping point where harvesting effort
exceeds maximum sustainable yield levels. It is assumed that TwRwPwS for
each fisher.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010688.t003
Table 4. Closed–access n–agent game.
NMv v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v vtN M§ § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §t
BCE R S
MSY T P
Agents: n fishers in a closed–access fishery. Strategies: MSY: harvest at
maximum sustainable yield levels; BCE: restrain harvesting effort to long-term
biodiversity-promoting levels. NM: number of agents who play MSY, t is
tipping point where harvesting effort leads to eventual decline in yield due to
ecological interaction with species of conservation value. It is assumed that
TwRwPwS for each fisher.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010688.t004
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are in order. First, resource users can and do develop informal
networks of trust and reciprocity norms that can solve open access
dilemmas [44]. Second, appealing solely to agents’ self–regarding
preferences can be counterproductive. In the discussion below we
consider evidence that suggests limitations of such narrow
mechanism–design solutions.
Discussion
What should happen when Nash equilibria are Pareto–
inefficient? The answer is simple: agents should cooperate.
However, willingness to do so depends on the level of trust, more
specifically, the degree of confidence an agent has that another
agent will not unilaterally change strategy. But this is what is
required to make Nash equilibria of games irrelevant in the sense
that agents would not have to worry about the possibility that
some agent will act without consideration of the others. How can
such trust be built? The obvious suggestion is more discussion and
deliberation and, especially, confidence–building measures in
these situations. In environmental decision contexts, given that
few agents actively claim an explicit desire to harm environmental
goods and services, collective decision–making through delibera-
tion is the obvious recommendation. In the South African case
study, the pursuit of such deliberative strategies should presumably
include conservation education and credible plans from conser-
vation proponents to offset costs incurred by herders and game
farmers due to predation by wild dogs. This recommendation is
easy to make because only two agents are involved. The situation
in the British example is more complex, requiring reciprocal
commitments between gamekeepers and the two classes of raptor
conservationists. For instance, if each of the three agents agreed to
drop a policy which is deemed best by only one agent, there would
remain only one outcome, (K, D, :I), on which they would have
to agree. In the case of overfishing on coral reefs in the Philippines,
collective deliberation would presumably have to take place
through public forums because of the number of agents that are
involved.
The contrast is with the traditional mechanism–design strategy
for achieving Pareto–efficient outcomes in games like those
presented earlier. The preferred strategy has been to alter material
incentives, on the assumption that self–interested actors will respond
to those incentives. These actors are assumed to be (or to closely
resemble) the (in)famous Homo economicus [45,46] of rational–choice
economic models, including traditional game theory, supplement-
ed by substantive assumptions about preferences over material
goods. Bowles [6] has noted this mechanism–design view makes
strong and controversial foundational assumptions. Narrow self–
interest is presumed to be the basis for social institutions and
resulting institutional arrangements. Insitutional policies are
supposed to work best when designed for ‘‘knaves.’’
While policies based on mechanism–design incentives have
some record of success, recent experimental results in behavioral
economics show that there are significant limitations to narrow
mechanism–design solutions [6,46] that are particularly relevant
in planning for environmental values, including biodiversity
conservation. In certain types of situation this style of solution
might actually backfire, by undermining the ‘‘moral sentiments’’ that
can contribute to cooperative behavior. In short, appeal to narrow
(material) self–interest may ‘‘crowd out’’ other–regarding motives.
Briefly, these types of limitations include the following [6]:
1. Framing and informational effects: Where cooperation is
‘‘framed’’ (in the psychologist’s sense) as required by regulation
or law, and enforced, e.g., by a fine, this may actually
undermine cooperative behavior over time. It may be better
to frame cooperation in the context of group decision–making
amidst informal networks of communication, appealing to
agents’ other-regarding motives [47]. Further, material incen-
tives may send a negative signal to the agents that can motivate
defection, for instance, because they may indicate a lack of trust
[48].
2. Learning effects: Incentives may provide an environment in
which agents ‘‘learn’’ to be more self–interested, and their
preferences shift over time to become less other–regarding [49].
3. Overdetermination: A significant body of psychological
research on ‘‘intrinsic’’ motivations suggests that, when agents
are offered financial incentives for actions for which they are
already intrinsically motivated (e.g., because they are pleasur-
able), intrinsic motivation may decrease significantly [50–54].
When these kinds of situations obtain, deliberative (rather than
formal) solutions that engage the ‘‘moral sentiments’’ (other-
regarding motives) of the agents are likely to better achieve the
goals envisioned by them. Encouraging agents to communicate
and reach agreements on behavior, for instance, through credible
promises of future behavior to each other, may be sufficient. If
agents are sure that others will not unilaterally change their
actions, the Nash equilibrium becomes irrelevant. Even in the
absence of explicit agreements, if each agent were aware of the
value structures of the other agents, that might provide reasonable
ground for expecting that other agents will not change behavior in
certain ways. Additionally, an agent may use knowledge of other
agents’ values to adjust the agent’s own courses of action. In both
of these cases, Nash equilibria may become irrelevant.
An important limitation of these analyses is their restriction to
pure strategies: agents do not have the option of mixed strategies
in which they sometimes carry out one action and sometimes do
not. Whether mixed strategies would also lead to the problems
noted here—and to what extent—remains an open question to be
explored on some other occasion. However, in the practical
context of conservation decisions, it is unlikely that any agent is
likely to follow a mixed strategy.
A final methodological point will conclude this paper. Though
game theory has been used in other environmental decision
contexts [4], it has very rarely been used in the context of decision
analysis for biodiversity conservation (and, even then, only in the
context of two–agent games. [5,55]). (With respect to biodiversity
policy, it has more often been used in contexts such as that of
stakeholder disagreement about intellectual property rights [56].)
The analysis here shows that it is relatively easy to use game theory
to identify situations in which the pursuit of individual self–interest
using whatever incentive set that is in place leads to sub-optimal
outcomes from the perspective of minimal group interests.
Typically, unlike almost all uses of game theory in environmental
decision contexts, the analysis will require multi-agent (rather than
two–agent) models. However, as this analysis shows, these models
may still not be intractably complex and can be fairly easily
analyzed. The most important point is that game theory can be
used as a normative tool to identify situations in which members of
groups (agents) should be encouraged to interact, communicate,
and deliberate jointly because the initial preference structure is
such that the Nash equilibria are definitively sub-optimal from the
point of view of what is desirable for a group.
Methods
This section briefly introduces the methodological framework of
decision analysis and game theory. The first subsection introduces
Game Theory in Biodiv Cons
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10688the case where a single agent makes a decision over a set of feasible
alternatives. The second introduces interdependent decision
problems (games), two standard criteria by which solutions are
evaluated, Nash equilibria and Pareto–efficiency, and an example
of a game with a Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibrium (the
Prisoner’s Dilemma).
Rational choice: a single agent
In the simplest case of rational decisions under certainty, a single
agent chooses between a set of feasible alternatives
A~fai : i~1,2,   ,ng, which are all (weakly) ranked according
to a single evaluative criterion K. The ranking ]K is a weak order
since indifference is allowed: a1 ]K a2 means that a1 is at least as
preferred as a2 and if, additionally, a2 ]K a1 holds, then the agent
is indifferent between a1 and a2. Strict preference an ]K am can be
defined as (an ]K am) ^: (am ]K an). Additionally, we require
the ranking ]K to satisfy the following constraints:
1. Completeness: all alternatives are ranked. Vm,n either am ]K an
or an ] am.
2. Symmetry: all alternatives are at least as preferred as themselves:
Vn,an ]K an.
3. Transitivity: if some alternative is weakly preferred to a second,
and the second to a third, the first is weakly preferred to the
third: Vm,n,o,i fam ]K an and an ]K ao then am ]K ao.
In the context of biodiversity consrvation planning, for instance,
the set of alternatives might be potential conservation areas and
the evaluative criterion some operational measure of biodiversity
value [57]. We assume our goal is to choose the most preferred
alternative among the feasible ones. In such a simple case, the
rational choice is clearly an alternative an such that Vm, an ]K am,
that is, an is at least weakly preferred to all other alternatives. Or,
equivalently, we choose the alternative aj such that :Aao such that
ao ]K aj and :(an ]K ao), that is, there does not exist an
alternative that is strictly preferred to aj. There may be more than
one alternative that satisfy these conditions, in which case we have
a tie for first place but, in this simple example, no information to
break such ties.
All of the agents in our game–theoretic examples exemplify this
simple case of decision over a single criterion–based ordinal
ranking under certainty, but with the added complication that
outcomes depend on the choices of other agents (see below).
However, more complicated decision scenarios may involve:
Multiple criteria: For many decision problems, there may
be multiple criteria of evaluation, producing rankings
over alternatives that may be in conflict. Various
methods have been devised for rational decision-making
with multiple criteria [58]. For a discussion of multi–
criteria analysis in the context of biodiversity conserva-
tion, see Moffett and Sarkar [3].
Cardinal utility: If information is available about how much
some alternatives are preferred to others, e.g., by using
the von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] method of
eliciting preferences over gambles, then a real-valued
‘‘utility’’ function U may be constructed that maps
alternatives to cardinal values. Utility is then a numerical
measure of preference.
Uncertainty: Many (perhaps most) decisions are made in
the context of uncertainty. Suppose that the probability
of the consequences of a decision are (causally and
epistemically) independent of which alternative is
chosen, and that probabilities can be assigned to those
consequences. Then rational choice maximizes ‘‘expect-
ed utility,’’ where the expected utility of an action is a
probability–weighted sum of its utility values in the
various outcomes.
Interdependent decisions: game theory
Definitions. Game theory can be used to model situations of
interdependent decisions, where multiple agents choose from their
own feasible set of alternatives (actions), and the outcome depends
on the choices of all the agents. Agents’ preferences are over the
outcomes, which are complete specifications of each of the agents’
actions. Thus we have a set of agents I~f1,2,:::,pg, a set of
feasible actions for each agent j, ja~fja : a~1,2,:::kg, and a set O
of possible outcomes ol, which are the possible j–tuples of actions
11 through jk. We assume for each agent j, a ranking ]j over the
outcomes in O. These rankings satisfy the constraints listed earlier.
Thus we make the simplifying assumption that each agent has a
single criterion ranking over the outcomes. Games with multiple
agents and multiple criteria are possible but not explored here.
An outcome is Pareto–efficient if and only if no agent could be
made better off without making another agent worse off. Thus
some outcome om is Pareto–efficient if and only if :Aoj=om such
that Vl,oj ]l om and Al such that oj ]l om. Pareto–efficiency is a
weak criterion, since any outcome most preferred by some agent is
ipso facto Pareto–efficient.
The Nash equilibrium [59], is that outcome such that no agent
can do better by unilaterally deviating from an existing pattern of
action. In other words, holding the strategies of the others fixed, if
no agent can change strategy and do better, the outcome is in
equilibrium. Thus some outcome ok is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if there does not exist a q such that there exists an alternative
action j’ a, keeping all other agents’ actions in ok fixed, leading to
outcome oj such that oj ]q ok. The sense in which this is an
‘‘equilibrium’’ is that no agent has an incentive to change strategy
unilaterally.
Finally, there is a distinction between one–off (static) and
iterated (dynamic) games. A game like the simple one above may
be played once, or multiple times, either between the same
individuals or between different individuals. The iterated version
allows for more interesting kinds of strategies, e.g., conditional
strategies, that is, an agent may choose an action in response to
other agents’ actions in the previous step. Notably, iterated games
provide the basis for evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game
theory gives up economists’ strong assumptions about agent
rationality. Agents in a population use fixed strategies and the
success of those strategies determines their frequency in the next
time step. Evolutionary game theory models frequency–dependent
selection, where the fitness (payoff) of some strategy depends on
the composition of the population.
The representational power and flexibility of game theory will
be seen in the following two examples. The first example will
illustrate game theory in perhaps the simplest of cases. The second
is the best–known example of games with Pareto–inefficient Nash
equilibria. We include it because we refer to it several times, for
instance, in connection to the case of wild dog conservation in
South Africa.
Driving coordination game. Consider first the two–agent
‘‘coordination’’ game of ‘‘driving’’ in Table 5, where each agent
either drives on the right or the left. Each agent strictly prefers the
outcomes where both drive on the right or the left to the (disastrous)
outcomes where their actions differ, but is indifferent between the
first pair of outcomes and the latter pair. The game can be
represented in ‘‘normal form’’ as a table like this one, where the
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most preferred outcomes and 2 that of less preferred ones.
In the driving example, both the vRight,Rightw and the
vLeft,Leftw outcomes satisfy the criterion of Pareto–efficiency,
since no agent can be made better off without making at least one
agent worse off—in fact, both would be worse off in the
vRight,Leftw or vLeft,Rightw outcomes. Furthermore, both
the vRight,Rightw and the vLeft,Leftw outcomes are Nash
equilibria. No agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
playing Right (Left), for example, if the other agent is also playing
Right (Left).
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The game in Table 6 is a generalized
ordinal formulation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a two–agent game,
where TwRwPwS for each agent. As a useful mnemonic, these
letters are usually taken to stand for temptation, reward,
punishment, and sucker, respectively. An agent corresponding to a
row and one corresponding between the row choose between
cooperation (C) and defection (D). Payoffs are given vRow,
Columnw in the matrix. In the standard quantitative formulation of
PD, where the ranks are interpreted as numbers, there is an
additional requirement: 2RwTzS.
The original story of the prisoner’s dilemma involves two
prisoners, separated by the police, whose options are to confess (D)
or to stay silent (C). If both stay silent, then both get a light prison
sentence (reward); if both confess, then both get a moderate prison
sentence (punishment). However if one confesses and one stays
silent, the confessor gets off without a prison sentence (temptation),
while the one who stayed silent gets a heavy prison sentence
(sucker). Each prisoner does better by confessing, no matter what
the other does. But each prisoner confessing leads to a worse
outcome for both prisoners than if they had both stayed silent.
The game is of significant interest because its Nash equilibrium,
vD,Dw, is Pareto–inefficient a scan be seen by comparing to the
mutually cooperative outcome, vC,Cw.I ti se a s yt os e et h a te a c h
agent does better defecting, no matter what the other agent does,
since TwR and PwS. However, each agent could be made better
off by switching to the cooperative outcome, since RwP. However,
the cooperative outcome vC,Cw is unstable, since either agent
could do better individually by switching to D,s i n c eTwR.
All the game–theoretic models analyzed in this paper share the
property that the Nash equilibria are Pareto–inefficient.
Supporting Information
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